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Abstract
We present a quantumly-enhanced protocol to achieve unconditionally secure delegated clas-
sical computation where the client and the server have both their classical and quantum comput-
ing capacity limited. We prove the same task cannot be achieved using only classical protocols.
This extends the recent work of Anders and Browne on the computational power of correla-
tions to a security setting. Concretely, we present how a client with access to a non-universal
classical gate such as a parity gate could achieve unconditionally secure delegated universal clas-
sical computation by exploiting minimal quantum gadgets. In particular, unlike the universal
blind quantum computing protocols, the restriction of the task to classical computing removes
the need for a full universal quantum machine on the side of the server and makes these new
protocols readily implementable with the currently available quantum technology in the lab.
1 Introduction
The concept of delegated quantum computing is the quantum extension of the classical task of
computing with encrypted data without decrypting them first. The fully homographic encryption
(FHE) scheme of [1] has resolved this 30 years open questions in the classical setting with computa-
tional security. On the other hand many quantum protocols [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 10, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19] address this challenge for a futuristic quantum client-server setting achieving
a wide range of security, and other properties. Among all these protocols a family of protocols
known as the Universal Blind Quantum Computing (UBQC) [4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] is the optimal one
in terms of the client’s requirements. The key properties of these protocols are given below.
• The security is unconditional.
• Client’s classical operations are efficient in the size of desired computation that is O(poly(n))
where n is the size of the desired computation (both input and operations) plus classical
memory.
• Client’s quantum operations are minimal, that is the generation of a restricted family of single
random qubits without any need for quantum memory.
• Client and server have one-way quantum communication of the size of the desired computa-
tion, that is O(poly(n)), where n is the size of the computation (both input and operations).
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• Client and server have a two-way classical communication of size O(poly(n)) where n is the
size of the computation (both input and operations).
• Server has a universal quantum computer of size O(poly(n)), i.e. he is able to manipulate
coherently the creation of an entangled state of size O(poly(n)).
The central challenge of the above protocols is the requirements of a server with a universal quantum
computer. The main contribution of this paper is the design of a family of secure delegated protocols
for only classical computing, where the server needs only to manipulate a few qubits. In what
follows we present the strategy for generating several such protocols where the following concrete
improvement will be obtained.
• Client’s classical operations are restricted to application of only XOR operators, the genera-
tion of classical random bits, and read out only memory of size O(poly(n)) where n is again
the size of the desired computation (both input and operations).
• Server has a simple quantum device to manipulate coherently the creation of an entangled
state of at most a constant number of qubits.
Our family of protocols will provide a non-universal client the possibility of unconditionally secure
delegation of any classical computation to a remote server that has access to basic quantum gad-
gets, currently available in many scientific and commercial labs. It is important to note that such
a functionality cannot be achieved with just purely classical devices as we prove later. Moreover,
we prove that our protocols are, in a sense, optimal in the quantum setting as one cannot further
simplify the protocol requirements, and achieve the same task using quantum states which are inde-
pendent from the input (impossibility of off-line quantum communication protocols). Furthermore
the requirements of the client’s devices are also minimal which could lead to the design of miniature
devices far smaller than any full scale classical computer. In comparison, in FHE protocols, the se-
curity is conditional on computational assumptions, the client needs to be universal, as does server,
while the overhead remains large. However the goal of FHE protocols is different to ours: client’s
problem is not universality, but the complexity of the computation and communication with the
server that needs to be independent of the complexity of the delegated computation. An interesting
open question for future work is whether a hybrid combination of two schemes could lead to a more
efficient (both in terms of performance and security) delegated computing scheme.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows, in Section 2 we describe the general concept
common to our protocols. Our main methods are presented in Sections 3 and 4, including a family
of entangled-based and also single qubit-based protocols. In Section 5 we present our main no-go
results: of the unfeasibility of achieving the same task with a purely classical non-universal client,
and the proof that our protocols cannot be modified to have just off-line communication. Section
6 discusses possible applications.
2 General Idea
The general idea behind all our proposed schemes for the secure computation of the universal
NAND gate is based on the following fact presented for the first time in [20]. Let M0 to denote a
Pauli-X measurement and M1 a Pauli-Y , then the three qubit measurement Ma ⊗ M b ⊗ Ma⊕b
of the GHZ state (denoted in this paper as |Ψ〉) computes NAND(a, b). We then extended this idea
that instead of switching the measurements one can simply apply the pre-rotation operation based
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on a, b and a⊕ b to the GHZ state and then the Pauli-X measurements of all three qubits achieve
the same task. So the client effectively chooses the measurement basis by this pre-rotation while
hiding his secret information as it is done in the universal blind quantum computing [4]. The next
trick is that additional random Z gates hide the outcome while achieving the same task. Our final
generalisation is to notice that the operations need not to be performed on a GHZ state but could
be performed sequentially on one single qubit |+〉 state as well. In other words if we denote the pi/2
rotation along the Z axis by S then we prove that the local operators of the form
S†aS†bS†a⊕b
encode the input of the client in the resource state while permitting the server to perform the
other operations required to compute the NAND gate. Since all the information of the client is
encoded in the phase of the states, additional randomly chosen Z gates achieve a full one-time
pad of the client’s information, which can easily be decoded by the client by a bit-flip. Analogous
effect is achieved in the case of the single qubit resource. We can then design a family of encryption
protocols in which S† rotations, parametrized by input bits a and b, and the XOR of the same
input bits, along with a Z-phase rotation parameterised by a single or a multitude of encryption
bits chosen by the client, prepare a resource state such that no information about the input bits is
accessible to the server from the encrypted resource states, and such that a fixed measurement of
this resource state results in a one-time padded bit equal to the NAND of the input bits.
While in this paper we have presented specific protocols based on various manipulations of the
single qubit |+〉 and three qubits entangled GHZ state, one could easily adapt these protocols
to cover various encodings necessary for the specific noise model or available resources within a
particular implementation platform.
3 Entangled-based Protocols
There are three types of protocols that we introduce here, to address various implementation
scenarios. These families achieve the same goal and differ only in the required quantum gadgets of
the client. In the first family of the protocols, it is assumed that client can create or have secure
access to some simple (few qubits) entangled states. On the other hand, in the second family it is
assumed that the client is able to measure the flying qubit that it receives through an untrusted
channel to perform its desired universal computation. In the third setting, the client needs only to
have the capacity to perform simple single qubit rotations. Importantly, in all three scenarios the
classical computation of the client is restricted to XOR operations.
3.1 Preparing Client
In this protocol client generates a GHZ state of 3 qubits which are rotated depending on the values
of the inputs a, b, a⊕ b and a random bit r. Qubits are sent through an untrusted quantum channel
from client to server who applies a Pauli-X measurement on the qubits and sends the classical
result to the client via an untrusted classical channel. Client produces the final output by applying
classical XOR gates between the received classical bits and the random bit (see Figure 1). In what
follows we denote a random selection of an element of a set by ∈R.
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Z
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M
M
M
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1. Preparing client SecureNAND
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Figure 1: Client generates a GHZ state of 3 qubits which are rotated  
depending on the values of the inputs a, b, their classical XOR and a random 
bit. Qubits are sent through an untrusted quantum channel from client to 
server. Sever applies a Pauli-X measurement on the qubits and sends the 
classical result to the client via an untrusted classical channel. Client produces 
the final output by applying classical XOR gates between the received 
classical bits and the random bit.
Key:
GHZ: Greenberg-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states Generator
S†, Z: (-π/2, π) – phase rotation quantum Operators or Identity quantum Operator 
depending on classical Control
 
R.G: Classical bits Random Generator
Tx: Transmiter
Rx: Receiver
q.c: quantum channel
c.c: classical channel
M: Quantum Measurement on Pauli-X
XOR: eXlusive OR classical gate
We will say any SecureNAND protocol is correct if for every run of the protocol where both players
are honest (adhere to the protocol) and for all inputs a, b we have
out = ¬(a ∧ b) = 1⊕ (ab)
This definition will be used for all the presented protocols in this paper. Throughout this paper
we will be using the notation for the logical and between two bits a, b as a ∧ b and ab interchange-
ably.
Lemma 1. Protocol 1 is correct.
Proof. First note that the protocol is correct if the following equality is true for all binary variables
a, b, r:
X1X2X3|Ψ′〉 = (−1)1⊕ab⊕r|Ψ′〉. (2)
4
Protocol 1 Entangled-based Preparing Client SecureNAND
• Input (to Client): two bits a, b
• Output (from Client): ¬(a ∧ b)
• The Protocol:
– Client’s round
1. r ∈R {0, 1}
2. Client generates
|Ψ′〉 = Zr1
(
S†1
)a(
S†2
)b(
S†3
)a⊕b|Ψ〉
and sends it to the Server.
– Server’s round
1. Server measures the quits 1,2 and 3, with respect to the observables X1, X2, and
X3, obtaining outcomes b1, b2 and b3, respectively.
2. Server sends b1, b2, b3 to Client
– Client’s round
1. Client computes
out = b1 ⊕ b2 ⊕ b3 ⊕ r (1)
2. Client outputs out.
as this equality guarantees that the parity of the outcomes of measurements of Server equals 1⊕ab⊕r
which implies Client will decode the correct outcome in Equation 1 of Protocol 1.
In the remainder of the proof we define
P b =
{
X, if b=0
Y, if b=1
and use the following Pauli and Clifford operator commutation relations:
P bZr = (−1)rZrP b, ∀ b, r ∈ {0, 1}
P bSr = (−1)(b⊕1)rSrP b⊕r, ∀ b, r ∈ {0, 1}
P b
(
S†
)r
= (−1)br (S†)r P b⊕r, ∀ b, r ∈ {0, 1}
and in particular the result that
X
(
S†
)r
=
(
S†
)r
P r, ∀ r ∈ {0, 1}
and the result from [21] stating that
P a1 P
b
2P
a⊕b
3 |Ψ〉 = (−1)(1⊕ab)|Ψ〉, ∀ a, b ∈ {0, 1}.
We proceed to show the Equation (2) holds:
X1X2X3|Ψ′〉 = X1X2X3Zr1
(
S†1
)a(
S†2
)b(
S†3
)a⊕b|Ψ〉 =[
X1Z
r
1
(
S†1
)a]
1
[
X2
(
S†2
)b]
2
[
X3
(
S†3
)a⊕b]
3
|Ψ〉 =
(−1)r
[
Zr1
(
S†1
)a
P a1
]
1
[(
S†2
)b
P b2
]
2
[(
S†3
)a⊕b
P a⊕b3
]
3
|Ψ〉 =
(−1)rZr1
(
S†1
)a(
S†2
)b(
S†3
)a⊕b
P a1 P
b
2P
a⊕b
3 |Ψ〉 =
(−1)1⊕ab⊕rZr1
(
S†1
)a(
S†2
)b(
S†3
)a⊕b|Ψ〉 = (−1)1⊕ab⊕r|Ψ′〉
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In the derivation above we have simply used the trivial commutativity of operators acting on disjoint
subsystems. So the Lemma holds. 
3.1.1 Security
The desired security properties for out two-party protocols are the ability of hiding the secret
information of the client (inputs bits) from the server, given formally below. This concepts is also
refereed to as the blindness from the server’s point of view.
Definition 2. We will say any SecureNAND protocol is secure (also referred as blind) if the
cumulative state sent from Client to Server (averaged over Client’s internal secret parameter r)
is fixed (independent from the input a and b). Again the same definition will be used for all other
protocols.
In other words, the system Server receives from Client could have been generated by Server without
receiving any information from Client. In the remainder of this paper we will use the following
short-hand:
X := |X〉〈X|,
for all labels X.
Lemma 3. Protocol 1 is blind.
Proof. For fixed input a, b the state Server receives from Client can be written as:∑
r
1
2
Zr1ηZ
r
1 (3)
with
η =
(
S†1
)a(
S†2
)b(
S†3
)a⊕b|Ψ〉〈Ψ|(S1)a(S2)b(S3)a⊕b
Note that η can be written as: S|Ψ〉〈Ψ|S†, where
S =
(
S†1
)a(
S†2
)b(
S†3
)a⊕b
The operator S does not depend on the ri variables, and is diagonal in the computational basis so
it commutes with Pauli Z operators. Using this commutation, the expression (6) resolves as:
S
(∑
r
1
2
Zr1 |Ψ〉〈Ψ|Zr1
)
S†
The operator
∑
r
1
2
Zr1 |Ψ〉〈Ψ|Zr1 can explicitly be written as∑
r
1
2
Zr1 |Ψ〉〈Ψ|Zr1 =
1
2
(
1
2
(|001〉〈001|+ |110〉〈110| − |001〉〈110| − |110〉〈001|) +
1
2
(|001〉〈001|+ |110〉〈110|+ |001〉〈110|+ |110〉〈001|)
)
=
1
2
(
001 + 110
)
Thus the operator above is diagonal in the computational basis, and commutes with S so we get:
S
(∑
r
1
2
Zr1 |Ψ〉〈Ψ|Zr1
)
S† =
(∑
r
1
2
Zr1 |Ψ〉〈Ψ|Zr1
)
SS† =
1
2
(
001 + 110
)
This state is independent from a and b and the lemma is proved. 
6
3.2 Measuring Client
a
b
(ab) XOR
XOR
XOR
M
M
M
Client Server
2. Preparing server SecureNAND
G
H
Z
Rx Txq.c.
MIn Out
Control
Figure 2: Server generates a GHZ state of 3 qubits. Qubits are sent through 
an untrusted quantum channel from server to client. Client applies a Pauli-X / 
Pauli-Y measurement on the qubits depending on the classical inputs a,b and 
their classical XOR. Client produces the final output by applying classical XOR 
gates between the measurement outputs.
Key:
GHZ: Greenberg-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states Generator
M: Quantum Measurement on Pauli-X or Pauli-Y depending on classical Control 
bit. 
 
Tx: Transmiter
Rx: Receiver
q.c: quantum channel
c.c: classical channel
XOR: eXlusive OR classical gate
In this protocol server generates a GHZ state of 3 qubits. The qubits are sent through an untrusted
quantum channel from the server to the client. The client applies a Pauli-X or Pauli-Y measurement
on the qubits depending on the classical inputs a and b and their classical XOR. Client produces
the final output by applying classical XOR gates between the measurement outputs (see Figure 2).
Lemma 4. Protocol 2 is blind and correct.
Proof. The correctness of this protocol follows directly from the result in [21]. The blindness of the
protocol trivially follows from the fact that no information is sent from the Client to the Server,
thus the protocol is blind in all no signaling theories (including standard Quantum Mechanics). 
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Protocol 2 Entangled-based Measuring Client SecureNAND
• Input (to Client): two bits a, b
• Output (from Client): ¬(a ∧ b)
• The Protocol:
– Server’s round
1. The Server prepares the state |Ψ〉 and sends it to the Client
– Client’s round
1. The client computes c = a ⊕ b, measures the quits 1,2 and 3, with respect to the
observables P a, P b, and P c, obtaining outcomes b1, b2 and b3, respectively.
2. Client computes
out = b1 ⊕ b2 ⊕ b3 (4)
3. Client outputs out.
3.3 Bounce Protocol
In this protocol we reduce the requirements on the client, which no longer has to measure or prepare
states, but rather only modify states prepared by the server. Server generates a GHZ state of 3
qubits and sends them via an untrusted quantum channel to the client. Client applies single-qubit
quantum operators depending on the values of the inputs a, b, a⊕b and 3 classical random bits. The
client sends the rotated qubits to the sever via an untrusted quantum channel. The sever applies
a Pauli-X measurement on the qubits and sends the classical result to the client via an untrusted
classical channel. The client produces the final output by applying classical XOR gates between
the received classical bits and the random bits (see Figure 3).
Lemma 5. Protocol 3 is correct.
Proof. The correctness is directly obtained from the correctness of the Entangled-based Preparing
Client SecureNAND. To see this note that the states the server performs the measurements on are
identical in the two protocols, up to the existence of possible Zr22 and Z
r3
3 rotations on the second
and third qubit. Since we both have that
XZr = (−1)rZrX, and
Y Zr = (−1)rZrY,
these rotations cause an additional (multiplicative) phase of (−1)r2⊕r3 . But this is compensated for
in the modified decoding of the client in stage 5 so the output is correct in this protocol as well. So
the Lemma holds. 
Lemma 6. Protocol 3 is blind.
Proof. For fixed input a, b the state server obtains in the protocol can be written as:∑
r1,r2,r3
1
8
(Zr11 Z
r2
2 Z
r3
3 ⊗ 1S) η (Zr11 Zr23 Zr33 ⊗ 1S) (6)
with
η =
((
S†1
)a(
S†2
)b(
S†3
)a⊕b ⊗ 1S) ρS ((S1)a(S2)b(S3)a⊕b ⊗ 1S) ,
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Protocol 3 Entangled-based Bounce SecureNAND
• Input (to Client): two bits a, b
• Output (from Client): ¬(a ∧ b)
• The Protocol:
– Server’s round
1. The Server prepares the state |Ψ〉 and sends it to the Client
– Client’s round
1. Client receives the state |Ψ〉 from the server.
2. Client generates r1, r2, r3 ∈R {0, 1}
3. Client modifies the state |Ψ〉 to |Ψ′〉 as follows
|Ψ′〉 = Zr11 Zr22 Zr33
(
S†1
)a(
S†2
)b(
S†3
)a⊕b|Ψ〉
and sends it to the Server.
– Server’s round
1. Server measures the quits 1,2 and 3, with respect to the observables X1, X2, and
X3, obtaining outcomes b1, b2 and b3, respectively.
2. Server sends b1, b2, b3 to Client
– Client’s round
1. Client computes
out = b1 ⊕ b2 ⊕ b3 ⊕ r1 ⊕ r2 ⊕ r3. (5)
2. Client outputs out.
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ab
(ab)
G
H
Z
XOR R.G
S† Z
XOR
XOR
M
M
M
Client Server
3. Bounce SecureNAND
S† Z
S† Z
XOR
XOR
XOR
Rx Txq.c.
RxTx q.c.
Rx Txc.c.
OpIn Out
Control
Figure 3: Server generates a GHZ state of 3 qubits and sends them via an 
untrusted quantum channel to the client. Client applies rotation quantum 
operators depending on the values of the inputs a, b, their classical XOR and 
3 classical random bits. Client sends the rotated qubits to sever via untrusted 
quantum channel. Sever applies a Pauli-X measurement on the qubits and 
sends the classical result to the client via an untrusted classical channel. 
Client produces the final output by applying classical XOR gates between the 
received classical bits and the random bits.
Key:
GHZ: Greenberg-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states Generator
S†, Z: (-π/2, π) – phase rotation quantum Operators or Identity quantum operator 
depending on classical Control
 
R.G: Classical bits Random Generator
Tx: Transmiter
Rx: Receiver
q.c: quantum channel
c.c: classical channel
M: Quantum Measurement on Pauli-X
XOR: eXlusive OR classical gate
where ρS is any state the malevolent server could have initially prepared. Note that the actions of
the client are only on a subsystem of the whole system in the state ρS , signifying that the server
might have prepared an entangled state, and sent only a subsystem to the client to be modified,
while keeping the remainder of the system.
Since Z operators commute with the phase S† operators, and the parameters of the phase operators
do not depend on ri values, by introducing the shorthand S =
((
S†1
)a(
S†2
)b(
S†3
)a⊕b ⊗ 1S) we
can rewrite the state of the server’s system as:
(S⊗ 1S)
∑
r1,r2,r3
1
8
(Zr11 Z
r2
2 Z
r3
3 ⊗ 1S) ρS (Zr11 Zr23 Zr33 ⊗ 1S)
(
S† ⊗ 1S
)
.
The state ρS has two partitions - the partition corresponding to the subsystem the server sends to
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the client, and the subsystem he keeps. Thus ρS can be written (in the Pauli operator basis) as:∑
i,j αi,j σi︸︷︷︸
C
⊗ σj︸︷︷︸
S′
where C denotes the subsystem sent to the client, and S′ the subsystem kept by the server, and σi
and σj denote general Pauli operators acting on the two respective subsystems.
Next, we have the following derivation:∑
r1,r2,r3
1
8
(Zr11 Z
r2
2 Z
r3
3 ⊗ 1S) ρS (Zr11 Zr23 Zr33 ⊗ 1S) =∑
r1,r2,r3
1
8
(Zr11 Z
r2
2 Z
r3
3 ⊗ 1S)
∑
i,j αi,j σi︸︷︷︸
C
⊗ σj︸︷︷︸
S′
(Zr11 Z
r2
3 Z
r3
3 ⊗ 1S) =
1
8
∑
i,j αi,j
(∑
r1,r2,r3
Zr11 Z
r2
2 Z
r3
3 σiZ
r1
1 Z
r2
3 Z
r3
3
)
⊗ σj =
Note that since both X and Y anticommute with Z, the expression∑
r1,r2,r3
Zr11 Z
r2
2 Z
r3
3 σiZ
r1
1 Z
r2
3 Z
r3
3
is non-zero only if all the single qubit operators making up σi are either Z or identity, and in both
cases diagonal in the computational basis. Thus, we can write the final expression of the derivation
above as: ∑
i,j α
′
i,jσ
′
i ⊗ σj
where σ′i is diagonal in the computational basis.
So, overall, for the state of the server’s system we have:
(S⊗ 1S)
∑
r1,r2,r3
1
8
(Zr11 Z
r2
2 Z
r3
3 ⊗ 1S) ρS (Zr11 Zr23 Zr33 ⊗ 1S)
(
S† ⊗ 1S
)
=
(S⊗ 1S)
∑
i,j α
′
i,jσ
′
i ⊗ σj
(
S† ⊗ 1S
)
=∑
i,j α
′
i,j (S⊗ 1S)σ′i ⊗ σj
(
S† ⊗ 1S
)
and since σ′i commute with S we get:∑
i,j α
′
i,jσ
′
iSS
† ⊗ σj =
∑
i,j α
′
i,jσ
′
i ⊗ σj
Since α′i,j is independent from a and b, this state is independent from a and b and the lemma is
proved. 
4 Single Qubit Protocols
Here, we give variants of a new class of secure NAND protocols which only require single qubit
manipulations. Similarly to the variants we have given for the GHZ-based protocols, the single
qubit protocol can also be modified to a client preparation or a measuring client protocol. In the
former, it is the client which would prepare the initial |+〉 state, whereas in the measuring client
protocol, the client would perform the final measurements. Both protocols are blind and correct as
a simple consequence of the Single Qubit Bounce SecureNAND protocol (that we describe below)
11
Protocol 4 Single Qubit Bounce SecureNAND
• Input (to Client): two bits a, b
• Output (from Client): ¬(a ∧ b)
• The Protocol:
– Server’s round
1. The Server prepares the state |+〉 and sends it to the Client
– Client’s round
1. Client receives the state |+〉 from the server.
2. Client generates r ∈R {0, 1}
3. Client modifies the state |+〉 to |Ψ〉 as follows
|Ψ〉 = ZrSaSb(S†)a⊕b|+〉
and sends it to the Server.
– Server’s round
1. The server measures the qubit with respect to the X basis, obtaining the outcome s
2. Server sends s to Client
– Client’s round
1. Client computes
out = s⊕ r ⊕ 1 (7)
2. Client outputs out.
see Figure 4, 5 and 6 in Appendix A. Thus, here we only need to analyse the Single Qubit Bounce
SecureNAND protocol (Protocol 4).
The server generates a single qubit state and sends it via an untrusted quantum channel to the
client. Client applies a series of rotation quantum operators depending on the values of the inputs
a, b, a⊕b, and a classical random bit. Client sends the rotated qubit to sever via untrusted quantum
channel. Sever applies a Pauli-X measurement on the qubit and sends the classical result to the
client via an untrusted classical channel. Client produces the final output by applying classical
XOR gates between the received classical bit, a classical bit in state 1 and the random bit (Figure
6 in Appendix A). To see the correctness note that if the server was honest, it is a straightforward
calculation to see the state of the qubit the server receives is
ZrZa∧b|+〉
Then the result of the measurement performed by the server is s = r ⊕ a ∧ b, and the decoding
produces out = 1⊕ a ∧ b as required.
To see the security, note that the most general strategy of the server is to prepare a bipartite
state pi1,2 and send the first subsystem to the client. Then the state of the server system (up to a
normalization factor 1/2), once the client performed her round is:∑
r
(
ZrZa∧b ⊗ 12
)
pi1,2
(
ZrZa∧b ⊗ 12
)
=
∑
r′
(
Zr
′ ⊗ 12
)
pi1,2
(
Zr
′ ⊗ 12
)
where r′ = r ⊕ a ∧ b. Since r is distributed uniformly at random, so is r′ so the state above does
not depend on a or b.
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5 Impossibility Results
The main result of this section is to prove the optimality of our protocol. We first prove that it is
impossible to achieve the similar task of secure delegated computing of our protocols by removing
the quantum requirement. Next we show that in the quantum case, the quantum states must depend
on the input of the client as it is done in our protocols. This result also indicates that a quantum
off-line protocol could not be achieved.
Theorem 1. No classical protocol, in which the client is restricted to XOR computations can
delegate deterministically computation of NAND to a server while keeping the blindness.
Proof. We prove this result first for the case of two rounds of communication, and no initial shared
randomness. Any such protocol will have the following three stages: client’s encoding, server’s
computation, and client’s decoding.
Client’s encoding. In this stage, the only thing the client can do is to compute C1(a, b,
−→x ), where
a, b are the input bits, −→x is a random bit string (of any length) and C1 is a computation which can
be implemented using only XOR gates. However, the state C1(a, b,
−→x ) must be independent from
a and b to maintain blindness when averaged over all −→x .
Server’s computation. The only thing the server can do is to apply some computable function S on
C1(a, b,
−→x ), thus returning S(C1(a, b,−→x )).
Client’s decoding. The only thing the client can do is to run some function C2, on all the data he
has, which is implementable using XOR gates only:
C2(a, b,
−→x , S(C1(a, b,−→x ))) = NAND(a, b) (correctness)
and the output must (deterministically) be the NAND of the inputs.
Let c = C1(a
′, b′,
−→
x′ ) be some constant the client may send to the server. Then, because of blindness
it must hold that for all a, b there must exist −→x (a, b), which depends on a, b such that
C1(a, b,
−→x (a, b)) = c.
To see this, note that if the client could send c, but not for some inputs a′′ and b′′, then upon
receiving c the server learns something about the input, namely that it is not a′′, b′′, which violates
blindness. Note also that since all the computations the client can perform use only XOR gates
(and without the loss of generality, reversible), the client can compute −→x (a, b) given a, b using only
XOR operations. But then, by the correctness of the protocol we have that
C2(a, b,
−→x (a, b), S(c)) = NAND(a, b) (correctness).
But S(c) is constant as well. This implies that given a fixed string S(c) the client can compute the
NAND of any input using just XOR gates, which is not possible.
This argument can be further generalized to a setting with shared randomness and many rounds
of communication. It is easy to see that the randomness cannot help as the protocol must be
deterministic (hence work for any sampling of the joint random variable), whereas using multiple
rounds (all of which must be independent of the input, from the viewpoint of the server) just yields
a longer constant string (analogous to S(c)) using which the client can compute the NAND on her
own, which is again impossible. 
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The above result highlights the magic of quantum phase exploited in our protocol where despite
sending a quantum state dependent on the input, the input bits remain inaccessible to the server.
Next, following a similar line of argument we prove that one cannot hope for an improvement of
our protocols i.e. a quantum oﬄine procedure (similar to universal blind quantum computing [4])
where the initial quantum states communicated in the protocol are independent of the secret input.
5.1 Impossibility of Oﬄine Communication
We begin by addressing protocols with two rounds of communication between the client and the
server. By round we refer to an instance of either the client sending a message to the server, or
the server sending a message to the client. Since the last message, for it to have any meaning,
must come from the server, the order of the two rounds is client → server, followed by server →
client. The generic description (definition) of a potential secure NAND quantum oﬄine protocol
with two rounds is given later in Protocol 7. In order to prove the impossibility of obtaining such
a protocol we prove several lemmas proving first the impossibility of a particular class of somehow
‘minimal’ NAND quantum oﬄine protocols (see Protocol 5 and 6 below). Following this, we present
the reduction between these protocols i.e. if a generic protocol of type Protocol 7 is possible then so
is the minimal protocol, hence proving the impossibility of obtaining any oﬄine quantum protocol.
These types of protocols are intimately linked to the composability of secure NAND computations
in a larger computation 1. Note that since, for the second layer of any computation, the client does
not know the inputs in advance (since he cannot compute them herself) but knows the encryption
of the outputs in advance, thus, quantum oﬄine protocols are necessary and probably sufficient
for the composition of NANDs in a larger computation, without requiring additional run-time
communication. The case where run-time communication is allowed will be studied presently. Note
also that it does not matter what function, which in tandem with XOR and NOT gates forms a
universal set, we use. For simplicity, here we focus on AND.
The simple quantum oﬄine secure AND computation with two rounds of communication (Simple
AND QO2, Protocol 5) is the most natural first attempt, which is inspired by information-theoretic
considerations - since the client’s input is two bits a and b, hence the quantum state encodes two
bits of x and y. Therefore to hide the two bits in the quantum state, additional randomness of two
bits r1 and r2 is needed.
To shorten our expressions, in this section we will be predominantly use ab to denote the logical
and of two bits a, b.
Recall that the correctness of these protocols are defined by requesting out = ab, and blindness is
defined by the equation ∑
x m(a, b) ⊗ ρx = η ∀a, b,
where a, b are the input bits, m(a, b) the classical message which may depend on the input, ρx a
quantum state which depends on some random parameters x (but may also depend on a, b), and η
is a positive-semidefinite operator, independent from a, b 2.
Lemma 7. No Simple SecureAND QO2 can be correct and blind.
1The security issues of composability of our protocols we do not explicitly address in this paper. However, we do
note that the lower bounds on what is possible we establish here imply that the impossibility results will also hold
true in any composable security setting.
2We are omitting any normalization factors, so η may be of non-unit trace.
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Protocol 5 Simple SecureAND QO2
The functionality of the Small AND protocol:
• Input (to the client): two bits a, b
• Output (from the client): (a ∧ b)
• The Protocol:
– Client’s round
1. Client generates a quantum state ρx,yr1,r2 , characterized by random bits x, y, r1, r2 and
sends it to the server.
2. Client receives her input bits a, b.
3. Client computes mc = (x⊕ a, y ⊕ b) and sends it to the server.
– Cerver’s round
1. Server performs a (generalized) measurement of ρx,yr1,r2 , parametrized by mc. He ob-
tains the outcome ms and sends it to the client.
– Client’s round
1. Client computes out = ms ⊕ r1 ⊕ r2.
2. Client outputs out.
Proof. As in any Simple SecureAND QO2 protocol the client sends two classical bits of information
to the server (here denoted a′, b′), without the loss of generality, we may assume that the message
the server returns to the client is a single bit measurement outcome of one of four (generalized)
measurements (one for each message (a′, b′)) which we denote Ma′,b′(ρx,yr1,r2). The correctness of the
protocol entails that
Ma
′,b′(ρx,yr1,r2) = (a
′ ⊕ x)(b′ ⊕ y)⊕ r1 ⊕ r2
For clarity we briefly comment on the equation above. Since, for message (a′, b′) the server per-
forms a generalized two-outcome measurement, this measurement can be represented by the POVM
elements Πa
′,b′
0 ,Π
a′,b′
1 (which are positive operators summing to the identity), corresponding to out-
comes 0 and 1, respectively. Then the equation above means that
Tr(Πa
′,b′
(a′⊕x)(b′⊕y)⊕r1⊕r2ρ
x,y
r1,r2) = 1
Then, by taking r = r1 ⊕ r2 and defining ρx,yr = 1/2(ρx,y0,r + ρx,y1,1⊕r) we get, by linearity, that
Ma
′,b′(ρx,yr ) = (a′ ⊕ x)(b′ ⊕ y)⊕ r,
or equivalently,
Tr(Πa
′,b′
(a′⊕x)(b′⊕y)⊕rρ
x,y
r ) = 1
and also that
Tr(Πa
′,b′
(a′⊕x)(b′⊕y)⊕rρ
x,y
r⊕1) = 0
The two equations above immediately entail that ρx,yr and ρ
x,y
r⊕1 must be (mixtures of mutually)
orthogonal states, which we denote ρx,yr ⊥ρx,yr⊕1. But, more generally, the equations above imply that
two states ρx,yr and ρ
x′,y′
r′ must be in orthogonal subspaces, whenever any of the sub/superscripts
differ. To see this, we will consider the remaining cases separately. First, assume that r = r′, but
x 6= x′ and/or y 6= y′. Then if we set a′ = x⊕ 1 and b′ = y ⊕ 1 we see that
Ma
′,b′(ρx,yr ) = (a′ ⊕ x)(b′ ⊕ y)⊕ r = 1⊕ r
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but
Ma
′,b′(ρx
′,y′
r ) = (a′ ⊕ x′)(b′ ⊕ y′)⊕ r = r
so the outcomes deterministically differ, meaning that the two states must be in orthogonal sub-
spaces. We have already seen that the same conclusion follows if r 6= r′, and x = x′ and y = y′.
The next case is when r 6= r′, and either x 6= x′ or y 6= y′ (but one is an equality). Assume that
x = x′, y 6= y′ and r = 0. Then if we set a′ = x = x′ we see that
Mx,b
′
(ρx,y0 ) = (x⊕ x)(b′ ⊕ y) = 0
and
Mx,b
′
(ρx,y
′
1 ) = (x⊕ x′)(b′ ⊕ y′)⊕ 1 = 1.
Similarly, if r = 1 we get opposite results, and if x 6= x′ and y = y′ we get the same by setting
b′ = y = y′. Finally, we must consider the case when all the parameters differ. First, assume r = 0,
then by setting a′ = x and b′ = 1⊕ y we get:
Ma
′,b′(ρx,y0 ) = (x⊕ x)(b′ ⊕ y) = 0, and
Ma
′,b′(ρx
′,y′
1 ) = (x⊕ x′)(1⊕ y ⊕ y′)⊕ 1 = 1
since y 6= y′, if r = 1 then the first equation above would yield 1, and the last would yield 0, since
1 ⊕ y ⊕ y′ = 0. Thus we can conclude that the states {ρx,yr }x,y,r are all in orthogonal subspaces.
But this means, in particular, that the states 1/4(
∑
r1,r2
ρx,yr1,r2) are in orthogonal subspaces for all
x, y which implies that there exists a measurement which perfectly reveals x and y given any ρx,yr1,r2 .
Thus, the server can perfectly learn x and y and, given the classical message of the client, the inputs
of the client, and the protocol is not blind. 
In the above proof we have quickly concluded that the two bits r1, r2 are superfluous and one will
suffice (which is intuitive as only one random bit is needed to one-time pad the one bit outcome).
This gives us the definition of the next general family of protocols (Small AND QO2, Protocol 6)
as we describe below and will refer to later.
Protocol 6 Small SecureAND QO2
The functionality of the Small AND protocol:
• Input (to the client): two bits a, b
• Output (from the client): (a ∧ b)
• The Protocol:
– Client’s round
1. Client generates a quantum state ρx,yr , characterized by random bits x, y, r and sends
it to the server.
2. Client receives her input bits a, b.
3. Client computes mc = (x⊕ a, y ⊕ b) and sends it to the server.
– Server’s round
1. Server performs a (generalized) measurement of ρx,yr , parametrized bymc. He obtains
the outcome ms and sends it to the client
– Client’s round
1. Client computes out = ms ⊕ r.
2. Client outputs out.
Lemma 8. No small SecureAND QO2 can be correct and blind.
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Proof. Obvious from the proof of impossibility of simple AND QO2, where we have actually reduced
simple to small protocols. 
5.2 Generalization: QO2
Protocol 7 SecureAND QO2
The functionality of the AND protocol:
• Input (to the client): two bits a, b
• Output (from the client): (a ∧ b)
• The Protocol:
– Client’s round
1. Client generates a quantum state ρx, characterised by a sequence of random param-
eters x = (x1, . . . , xn), and sends it to the server.
2. Client receives her input bits a, b (the client could have had her bits all along. It is
however the defining property of quantum-oﬄine protocols that the parameters x
are independent from a, b).
3. Client computes an XOR-computable function
mc = XORE(a, b,x)
(E for encryption) of the input and the random parameters. Note that it would be
superfluous for the client to generate additional random values at this stage - they
could be part of x, without influencing the state the client generates.
4. Client sends mc to the server.
– Server’s round
1. Server performs a (generalized) measurement of ρx, parametrized by mc. He obtains
the outcome ms and sends it to the client.
– Client’s round
1. Client computes an XOR-computable function
out = XORD(a, b,x,ms)
(D for decryption).
2. Client outputs out.
In order to prove a reduction between the general case of Protocol 7 and the simple scenario
of Protocol 6 we start with a supposedly given blind and correct QO2 protocol and iteratively
construct a blind correct small QO2, using a sequence of claims which define increasingly simpler
protocols.
Theorem 2. If there exists a blind, correct SecureAND QO2 then there exists a blind correct Small
SecureAND QO2.
The objects which appear in the protocol (which differ from the objects in the small QO2) are as
follows:
ρx, with x = (x1, . . . , xn) − the quantum state parametrized by n bits
mc = XORE(a, b,x) − the m bit message from the client
ms, the k bit message from the server
ab = out = XORD(a, b,x,ms) − the calculation of the output
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Claim 1. Nothing is gained from using multi-bit ms.
Proof. Note that since the client is restricted to computing XOR operations, we can dissect
XORD(a, b,x,ms)
and see that it must be of the form
XORD(a, b,x,ms) = XOR
′
D(a, b,x)⊕
⊕
j∈I⊆[k][ms]j ,
where [ms]j is the j
th bit of the k-bit message ms. That is, it is a mod 2 addition of something
which does not depend on the server’s message, and the mod 2 addition of some of the bits of the
message responded by the server. Since the form of the message (i.e the explicitly description of
the function XORD) is public, being in the protocol description, the protocol remains secure and
correct if the server himself computes the bit
⊕
j∈I⊆[k][ms]j , and returns this to the client. Thus,
for every correct, blind QO2 there exists a correct blind QO21 where the server’s message comprises
only one bit. The remainder of the claims assumes we are dealing with a QO21 protocol.
Claim 2. No random parameters which do not appear in the encryption or decryption are needed.
Proof. Let S ⊂ [n] be a subset of indices of the random parameters which appear in either encryp-
tion (as variables of XORE) or decryption (XORD), and let S
′ = [n] \ S be the subset which does
not appear. Then, by exchanging the state ρx with the state
(ρ′)x
′
=
∑
xj |j∈S′
1
2|S′|
ρx
in a QO21 protocol it is easy to see we again obtain a protocol (which we refer to as QO22) which
is correct and blind. In QO22 protocols, all the random parameters appear either in the decryption
or encryption. The remainder of the claims assumes we are dealing with a QO22 protocol.
Claim 3. No more than one random parameter which appears only in the decryption is needed.
Proof. Let SD\E ⊂ [n] be the set of indices of random parameters which appear only in the
decryption, that is, as a variable of the function XORD. Without the loss of generality, we will
assume that the last k indices are such. Then XORD(a, b,x,ms) (due to the restrictions on the
client) can be written as:
XORD(a, b,x,ms) = XOR
′
D(a, b,ms, x1 . . . , xn−k)⊕ xn−k+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xn,
Then, by exchanging the state ρx with the state
(ρ′)x1,...,xN−k,x =
∑
xj |j∈SD\E
s.t.⊕jxj=x
1
2|SD\E |−1
ρx
in a QO22 protocol we again obtain a protocol (which we refer to as QO23) which is correct and
blind. Blindness is trivial, as the sum over all the random parameters for the state ρx yields the
same density operator as the sum over all random parameters for the state (ρ′)x1,...,xn−k,x (and no
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message correlated to the summed up random parameters is sent from the client to the server).
Correctness holds as the correctness of the (original) QO22 protocol only depended on the parity
of the k random parameters, and the construction above preserves this. 
In QO23 protocols, at most one random parameter appears in the decryption only. The remainder
of the claims assumes we are dealing with a QO23 protocol.
Claim 4. Client’s input bits a and b do not need to appear in the decryption function.
Proof. In general the decryption function of the client (for QO23) protocols attains the form
XORD(a, b,x,ms) = XOR
′
D(a, b,ms)⊕
⊕
j∈SE∩D xj ⊕ xn or
XORD(a, b,x,ms) = XOR
′
D(a, b,ms)⊕
⊕
j∈SE∩D xj
where SE∩D is the set of indices of random parameters which appear in both the decryption and
encryption function, and xn may appear only in the decryption function. Here, we have assumed
without the loss of generality that it is the last random parameter that (possibly) appears only in
the decryption function. First, we show that at least one random parameter must appear in the
decryption, meaning that either xn must appear or SE∩D is non-empty (or both). Assume this is
not the case. Then we have
XORD(a, b,x,ms) = XOR
′
D(a, b,ms)
and this must be equal to ab by the correctness of the protocol. But, due to the restrictions of the
client we have
XOR′D(a, b,ms) = XOR
′′
D(a, b)⊕ms = ab or
XOR′D(a, b,ms) = XOR
′′
D(a, b) = ab
The latter is not possible as no function computable using only XOR can yield the output ab, so
XOR′D(a, b,ms) = XOR
′′
D(a, b)⊕ms = ab⇔
ms = ab⊕XOR′′D(a, b).
The function XOR′′D(a, b) can only be one of six functions, which are such that either a or b appear
in the decryption:
XOR′′D(a, b) = a; XOR
′′
D(a, b) = 1⊕ a
XOR′′D(a, b) = b; XOR
′′
D(a, b) = 1⊕ b;
XOR′′D(a, b) = a⊕ b; XOR′′D(a, b) = 1⊕ a⊕ b.
But, for all of these functions we have that ab⊕ XOR′′D(a, b) is correlated to a, b, hence not blind.
For example a⊕ b⊕ ab = a∨ b, so if the server obtains ms = 0 this means a = b = 0. Thus, for the
protocol to be blind, at least one random parameter must appear in the decryption.
Let j be the index of this random parameter. Then xj either appears or does not appear in the
encryption. First assume xj appears in the encryption, and let XOR
′′
D(a, b) = a. Then by modifying
XORD in such a way that it no longer depends on a (by substituting XOR
′′
D(a, b) with 0 in the
definition of XORD) and by modifying the encryption function in such a way that all instances of xj
are substituted with xj ⊕XOR′′D(a, b), we obtain a new protocol, in which the inputs a, b no longer
appear in the decryption function. This protocol is correct, as the initial protocol was correct for
all possible inputs and random variables, and all we have done is a substitution of variables. Since,
from the perspective of the server, both xj ⊕XOR′′D(a, b) and xj are equally distributed (uniformly
at random), the protocol is blind as well.
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Consider now the case where xj does not appear in the encryption (thus no random parameters
appearing in the encryption appear in the decryption), and let XOR′′D(a, b) be the function which
appears in the evaluation of the decryption, and is not constant. Then, we need to modify the
messages the client sends, and the measurement the server does. Let mc be the message the client
sends in the original protocol. Then, in the modified protocol, the client will send the message
(mc,XOR
′′
D(a, b)⊕y), where y is a new random bit. The server will perform the same measurement
as in the original protocol, as defined by mc but will output m
new
s = m
original
s ⊕ XOR′′D(a, b) ⊕ y.
Note that this process can be viewed as a redefinition of the measurement the server does. the client
decrypts almost the same as in the original protocol, altered by substituting XOR′′D(a, b) with 0,
and by XORing with y . So we have:
The original decryption in original protocol :
out = XOR′′D(a, b)⊕moriginals ⊕ xj
The new decryption in new protocol :
0⊕mnews ⊕ xj ⊕ y = moriginals ⊕XOR′′D(a, b)⊕ y ⊕ xj ⊕ y = out.
Thus, the new protocol is also correct. To see that it is blind, note that the only piece of additional
information given to the server, relative to the original protocol is the bit XOR′′D(a, b)⊕y. However,
since y is chosen uniformly at random, this reveals no extra information so the protocol is blind as
well.
Thus for every QO23 blind correct protocol, there exists a blind correct QO24 protocol where the
inputs of the client do not appear in the decryption function. 
To summarise, to this point we have shown that we only need to consider protocols in which the
server’s output is a single bit, at most one random parameter which appears in the decryption (but
not in encryption) is used, and the decryption function does not take the inputs of the client as
parameters. Additionally we have shown that we only need the random parameters which appear
either in encryption or decryption. Next, we deal with the size of the client’s messages, and the
number of required random parameters appearing in the encryption.
Consider the encryption, and the generated quantum state in the protocol:
mc = XORE(a, b,x) − the m bit message from the client
ρx, for x = (x1, . . . , xn) − the quantum state parametrized by n bits.
and let (mc)j denote the j
th bit of the m bit message mc.
Claim 5. No single isolated random variables are needed.
Proof. Assume that, for some j and k we have, (mc)j = xk. Then, the protocol reveals xk. But
this means that if we fix xk = 0 (that is, by dropping that random parameter from the protocol)
we yield again a blind correct protocol (with one less random parameter). We get the same if the
negation of xk appears. By repeating this, we obtain a protocol for which no part of the message
is equal to a single random parameter, or its negation. 
Claim 6. No arbitrary XOR functions of random variables are needed.
Proof. Next, assume that for some j and k, l we have, (mc)j = xk ⊕ xl. Then, we can introduce
the variable xk,l = xk ⊕ xl, and substitute all instances of xl in the protocol with xk,l ⊕ xl. This
again yields a correct blind protocol, with the same number of random parameters as the original
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protocol. However, the modified protocol has the new variable xk,l appearing in (mc)j isolated, so
it (by the argument in the last paragraph) be dropped from the protocol.
We can perform analogous substitutions whenever arbitrary XOR functions of random parameters
appear in isolation: for a function b ⊕ xk1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xkp we can define the substituting variable
xbk1,...,kp = b⊕xk1⊕· · ·⊕xkp , and substitute all instances of xk1 with xbk1,...,kp⊕b⊕xk2⊕· · ·xkp . Thus
we retain exactly the same number of random parameters, but xbk1,...,kp now appears in isolation.
So, this variable can be dropped.
Thus, for any QO24 protocol, there exists a protocol (blind and correct) where no functions of
random parameters appear in isolation in mc.
Thus, each entry of mc is of the form XOR(a, b, x1, . . . xn), where this function is not constant
in a or b (or both). However, it is clear that this function cannot be constant in all the random
parameters x as otherwise the protocol would not be blind. 
We can now complete the main proof of the impossibility of quantum oﬄine protocol by showing
how the redundancies could be removed.
Proof of Theorem 2
Assume (mc)j = XOR(a, b)⊕
⊕
k∈Sj⊆[N ] xk and (mc)k 6=j = XOR(a, b)⊕
⊕
k∈Sk⊆[N ] xk (that is the
same function of a, b appears twice in the message). Then, the XOR of those two entries reveals
the XOR of the random parameters with indices in the intersection Sj ∩ Sk. Let
x˜ =
⊕
k∈Sj⊆[N ] xk ⊕
⊕
k∈Sk⊆[N ] xk =
⊕
k∈Sk∩Sj⊆[N ] xl
Then the original protocol is equally blind as the protocol (we will call it MOD1 for modification
1) in which the message element (mc)k is substituted with x˜ and the server, upon the receipt of
the message redefines (mc)k := (mc)j ⊕ x.
For simplicity, assume that Sk ∩ Sj = {1, 2, . . . l}. If we further modify MOD1 to MOD2 by sub-
stituting all instances of x1 in this protocol with x˜⊕ x2 . . . xl we obtain a protocol in which x˜ is a
randomly chosen variable, and note that it appears isolated in message element (mc)k. Thus, it can
by the arguments we presented earlier, be dropped from the protocol, by setting it to zero. Note
that analogous transformations of the protocol can be done if the XOR functions on two positions
differ by a bit flip.
Hence, we only need to consider protocols where each function of a, b in the message of the client
appears only once, where functions which differ by a bit flip can be considered duplicates as well.
There are only three XOR computable non-constant functions of two binary parameters, up to a
bit flip:
XOR(a, b) = a, XOR(a, b) = b, XOR(a, b) = a⊕ b
Thus, the message the client sends to the server, without the loss of generality, is of the form:
mc = (a⊕
⊕
k∈S1⊆[n] xk, b⊕
⊕
k∈S2⊆[n] xk, a⊕ b⊕
⊕
k∈S3⊆[n] xk)
Now, we can eliminate any single one of the three, and for our purposes of reduction to the small
QO2 protocol, we will eliminate the last one. Note that
(mc)3 = (mc)1 ⊕ (mc)2 ⊕
⊕
k∈S1⊆[n] xk ⊕
⊕
k∈S2⊆[N ] xk ⊕
⊕
k∈S3⊆[N ] xk,
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and that the server can obtain
x˜ =
⊕
k∈S1⊆[n] xk ⊕
⊕
k∈S2⊆[n] xk ⊕
⊕
k∈S3⊆[n] xk
by XORing the three bits of the client’s message. Thus, similarly to the approach we used earlier,
the protocol can be further modified in such a way that x˜ is given as the third bit of the message.
Furthermore, by substitution, the third bit can be eliminated as well. Thus we obtain the third
modification of the protocol, in which the client’s message is of the form
mc = (a⊕
⊕
k∈S1⊆[n] xk, b⊕
⊕
k∈S2⊆[n] xk)
with S1 ∪ S2 = [n]. Note S1 6= S2 as otherwise the protocol would not be blind. Let SDE be the
subset of indices of the random parameters which appear in the decryption and encryption. Then
all the random parameters in S1 \ (S2 ∪ SDE) can be substituted by only one random parameter
x˜1 which is the mod 2 sum of random parameters indexed in S1 \ (S2 ∪ SDE). Additionally, the
quantum state the client sends to the server needs to be averaged over all states where the mod 2
sum of random parameters indexed in S1 \ (S2 ∪SDE) is zero (for x˜1 = 0) and for the case it is one
(for x˜1 = 1). The same can be done for all the random parameters in S2 \ (S1 ∪ SDE), generating
the single random parameter y˜1 appearing only in (mc)2.
The indices in SDE must appear either in S1 or in S2. Let p1 . . . pq be the set which appears in both.
Then we can substitute these random parameters with one p˜ = p1⊕· · ·⊕pq by again modifying the
state the client sends to the server, by averaging over those states for which p = 0 or p = 1. Similarly
can be done for those indices in SDE which appear only in (mc)1 (same for (mc)2 ) resulting in one
random parameter x˜2 (y˜2).
Thus we obtain the protocol in which the client sends
mc = (a⊕ x˜1 ⊕ x˜2 ⊕ p, b⊕ y˜1 ⊕ y˜2 ⊕ p)
and the decryption is given with:
out = ms ⊕ x˜2 ⊕ y˜2 ⊕ p⊕ r
where r was the random parameter not appearing in the encryption, and the quantum state is
parametrized with:
ρx˜1,x˜2,y˜1,y˜2,p,r
We will refer to such protocols as QO25 protocols.
Note that
Mα,β(ρx˜1,x˜2,y˜1,y˜2,p,r) = (α⊕ x˜1 ⊕ x˜2 ⊕ p)(β ⊕ y˜1 ⊕ y˜2 ⊕ p)⊕ x˜2 ⊕ y˜2 ⊕ p⊕ r
and equivalently that
Mα,β(ρx˜
′
1,x˜
′
2,y˜
′
1,y˜2,p
′,r′) = (α⊕ x˜′1 ⊕ x˜′2 ⊕ p′)(β ⊕ y˜′1 ⊕ y˜′2 ⊕ p′)⊕ x˜′2 ⊕ y˜′2 ⊕ p′ ⊕ r′.
Therefore we obtain the following relation:
Mα,β(ρx˜1,x˜2,y˜1,y˜2,p,r) = Mα,β(ρx˜
′
1,x˜
′
2,y˜
′
1,y˜
′
2,p
′,r′) if
x˜1 ⊕ x˜2 ⊕ p = x˜′1 ⊕ x˜′2 ⊕ p′, and
y˜1 ⊕ y˜2 ⊕ p = y˜′1 ⊕ y˜′2 ⊕ p′ and
x˜2 ⊕ y˜2 ⊕ p⊕ r = x˜′2 ⊕ y˜′2 ⊕ p′ ⊕ r′.
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Since the state ρ is parametrized by 6 independent parameters and we have three independent
equations, this implies that there are 8 differing equivalency classes (as defined by the three equali-
ties) over the set of all possible random parameters. The equivalency classes can be represented by
three bits c1, c2, c3 as follows:
(c1, c2, c3) ≡ {(x˜1, x˜2, y˜1, y˜2, p, r)|x˜1 ⊕ x˜2 ⊕ p = c1
y˜1 ⊕ y˜2 ⊕ p = c2, x˜2 ⊕ y˜2 ⊕ p⊕ r = c3}
We can then define the states ρ, averaged per equivalency class:
ρc1,c2,c3 = 1/8
∑
(x˜1,x˜2,y˜1,y˜2,p,r)∈(c1,c2,c3) ρ
x˜1,x˜2,y˜1,y˜2,p,r
Note that the first bit of the message the client sends to the server in QO25 is given with (a⊕x1⊕
x2⊕p) which is equal to c1. Similarly, the second bit (b⊕y1⊕y2⊕p) is equal to c2. The decryption
is given with out = ms ⊕ x2 ⊕ y2 ⊕ p⊕ r which is equal to ms ⊕ c3.
This gives us a protocol in which: the client sends
mc = (a⊕ c1, b⊕ c2)
and the decryption is given with:
out = ms ⊕ c3
where c3 was the random parameter not appearing in the encryption, and the quantum state is
parametrized with:
ρc1,c2,c3
This protocol is correct by construction, and it is also blind as the classical messages the client
sends are the same as in the QO25 protocol, and the quantum state is averaged over the degrees
of freedom which do not appear in the abbreviated protocol - but then the averaging over the
remaining free parameters yields the same state on the server’s side as in the QO25 protocol. Thus
it is blind as well.
But this is also a small QO2 protocol. Thus, symbolically, we have shown:
∃QO2→ ∃QO21 → ∃QO22 → ∃QO23 → ∃QO24 → ∃QO25 → ∃ small QO2
which implies the proof of the main theorem since we have already proven no small QO2 protocol
exists. 
We believe that multiple rounds of classical or quantum communication cannot help either. This
can be seen as the operation the client tries to perform, that is an AND, cannot be broken down
into a sequence of operations which are themselves not universal for classical computation, when
used in conjunction with XOR and NOT. However, we leave the general proof of impossibility for
future work.
The above discussion also points at the impossibility of extending our protocol to entangled non-
commuting servers to remove any quantum component from the client side. This scenario was
originally proposed for the universal Blind Quantum Computing [4] where the client requests one
server to measure his part of entangled state in the basis 1/
√
2(|0〉 ± eiθ|1〉), θ being a randomly
chosen parameter known only to server 1 and the client. This step replace the requirement of the
client device to prepare and send single qubit to the server 2. Now, the client could follow the
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step of the original protocol by adapting the required correction due to the random result of the
measurement of the server 1. In the above construction revealing parameter θ to server 1 does
not effect the blindness [4]. However as proved before, any blind quantum AND protocol requires
quantum states that are dependent on the client’s input. Therefore once could not delegate the
preparation of such states to any untrusted servers.
6 Discussion
The family of SecureNAND protocols presented in this paper highlights the role of a single quan-
tum state in obtaining a security task unattainable in a classical setting, mirroring the super-dense
coding protocol [22] for communication tasks. While the presented no-go results emphasize new
conceptual aspects of quantum theory and could potentially be linked to the study of quantum
games, a new exciting direction we envision to explore further is a hybrid quantum-classical scheme
for delegated classical computing. Any advancement to the problem of secure delegated computa-
tion would have an immediate significant consequence on how computational problems are solved
in the real world. One can envision virtually unlimited computational power to end users on the
go, using just a simple terminal to access the computing cloud which would turn any smartphone
into a quantumly–enhanced smartphone. Only then could we truly justify our proposed title of
quantum-enhanced secure delegated classical computing! While the crucial challenge in developing
classical schemes for delegated computing is the design of encryption procedures that are indepen-
dent from the complexity of the function of interest, in SecureNAND protocols the bottleneck is
the required quantum communication between the client and the server. These two seemingly unre-
lated features are in fact deeply connected as our no-go results demonstrate and the investigation of
their relationship will dictate the practical success of a possible hybrid quantum-classical delegated
computing.
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(ab)
R.G
XOR
XOR
M
Client Server
4. Single Qubit Preparing client SecureNAND
S.Q.G.
S† S S† Z
a
b XOR
RxTx q.c.
Rx Txc.c.
1
OpIn Out
Control
Figure 4: Client generates a single qubit state which is rotated  depending on 
the values of the inputs a, b, their classical XOR and a random bit. Qubit is 
sent through an untrusted quantum channel from client to server. Sever 
applies a Pauli-X measurement on the qubit and sends the classical result to 
the client via an untrusted classical channel. Client produces the final output 
by applying classical XOR gates between the received classical bit, a classical 
bit in state 1 and the random bit.
Key:
S.Q.G.: Single Qubit Generator
S, S†, Z: (π/2, -π/2, π) – phase rotation quantum Operators or Identity quantum 
Operator depending on classical Control
 
R.G: Classical bits Random Generator
Tx: Transmiter
Rx: Receiver
q.c: quantum channel
c.c: classical channel
M: Quantum Measurement on Pauli-X
XOR: eXlusive OR classical gate
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(ab)
XOR
XOR
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5. Single Qubit Preparing server SecureNAND
S.Q.G.Rx Txq.c.
1
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Control
Figure 5: Server generates a single qubit state. Qubit is sent through an 
untrusted quantum channel from server to client. Client applies a series of 
rotation quantum operators and a final Pauli-X / Pauli-Y measurement on the 
qubit depending on the classical inputs a,b and their classical XOR. Client 
produces the final output by applying a classical XOR gate between the 
measurement output and a classical bit in state 1.
Key:
S.Q.G: Single qubit Generator
M: Quantum Measurement on Pauli-X or Pauli-Y depending on classical Control 
bit.
S†, S: (-π/2, π/2) – phase rotation quantum Operators or Identity quantum 
operator depending on Control bit. 
 
Tx: Transmiter
Rx: Receiver
q.c: quantum channel
c.c: classical channel
XOR: eXlusive OR classical gate
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6. Single-Qubit Bounce SecureNAND
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Figure 6: Server generates a single qubit state and sends it via an untrusted 
quantum channel to the client. Client applies a series of rotation quantum 
operators depending on the values of the inputs a, b, their classical XOR and a 
classical random bit. Client sends the rotated qubit to sever via untrusted 
quantum channel. Sever applies a Pauli-X measurement on the qubit and 
sends the classical result to the client via an untrusted classical channel. Client 
produces the final output by applying classical XOR gates between the 
received classical bit, a classical bit in state 1 and the random bit.
Key:
S.Q.G.: Single Qubit Generator
S, S†, Z: (π/2, -π/2, π) – phase rotation quantum Operators or Identity quantum 
operator depending on classical Control
 
R.G: Classical bits Random Generator
Tx: Transmiter
Rx: Receiver
q.c: quantum channel
c.c: classical channel
M: Quantum Measurement on Pauli-X
XOR: eXlusive OR classical gate
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